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ABSTRACT 
In a knowledge-based economy, the issues of technology transfer and management of 
technology, especially in sensitive strategic industries, are of major concern. The transfer of 
technology is a complex multidisciplinary area of technology management involving technology 
transfers from overseas developing agencies and internal technology transfers. Technology is 
a combination of four basic com~onents-facilities, abilities, facts, and frameworks. Economics 
of scale and complexities in technologies, especially in major weapon systems, would increasingly 
render the concepts of self sufficiency and evenself-reliance impossible ideals to achieve, even 
by the developed countries. In such a scenario, transfer of technology will continue to be used 
as a powerful tool of global geopolitical power projection by the developed countries as an 
extension of their foreign policies. For nations like India, there is no option but to invest in the 
indigenous RCD and SCT base in sensitivelstrategic industries. Experience in transfer of 
technology with those of space, defence research, atomic energy, scientific and industrial research 
must be pooled into knowledge bank to achieve synergy. 
Keywords: Transfer of technology, knowledge-based economy, technology management, national 
security, technology-transfer agent, product-development, technology-transfer strategy, 
manufacturing plan 
1. INTRODUCTION workers: Peter E Drucker goes to  the extent of 
The venerable doyen of  management gurus, 
Peter F. Drucker, was the first, prescient observer 
to  comment on the emergence of knowledge as  the 
prime source of an industrialised nation's competitive 
advantage, and the power of  knowledge workers, 
in the post-industrial, borderless, global economy 
that is evolving since mid-1980s. The second industrial 
insisting that the only competitive advantage of 
the developed countries is the supply of knowledge 
workers, a s  the knowledge constantly makes itself 
obsolete, with the result that today's advanced 
knowledge is tomorrow's ignorance, a stand supported 
by other experts in the field like Prof Michael E. 
Porter. 
- 
revolution, as some observers have termed the current, 
knowledge-based rapid advances in information 2. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
technology, genetic engineeringlbiotechnology and In such a scenario of a knowledge-based' economy, 
allied fields, would be  dominated by those nations the issues of  technology transfer and management 
that possess the highest quality workforce of knowledge of technology, especially in sensitive strategic industries, 
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are of major concern, not only in the context of 
national competitiveness but also in the context of 
national sovereignty and security interests. The 
field of transfer of technology is a complex multi- 
disciplinary area of technology management involving 
technology transfers from overseas developing agencies 
and internal technology transfers of indigenous to 
local, and (in some rare cases in the Indian context), 
to foreign clients. 
It must be recognised that the technology transfer 
agent is no longer merely feeding information as 
in the semi-active mode. The technology transfer 
agent is a technologist who is actively searching 
for the solution to the problem. The agent must 
have a clear understanding of what it takes to satisfy 
the needs of the user. It is with this solution that 
the entrepreneur can proceed to fabricate a prototype, 
test it, manufacture the product, and sell it. This 
is the general statement of technology transfer. 
Although, successful technology transfer can be 
accomplished when the entire market demand is 
for a single manufactured unit, it is more usually 
the case that successful technology transfer is marked 
by the steady entrance of a manufactured product 
into the -marketplace. 
2.1 Elements of Technology Transfer Cycle 
Experience has shown that certain elements in 
the demonstration process must, at a minimum, be 
present during the transfer cycle2. These are: 
A firm statement of user need 
A clearly stated and understood boundary of 
solutions (acceptable solutions) 
A firm commitment by the user to remain 
actively associated during and after the 
technology transfer 




A champion and an entrepreneur (who may 
also be the champion) are the most important 
elements. 
2.2 Transition from Research to Product 
Development 
2.2.1 IBM Case Studies 
Cohen', et a l . ,  focusing on the transfer of 
technology from research to a profitable commercial 
enterprise, describe a study of 18 IBM projects; 
some of these were successful, while the other 
failed. They prepared valuable guidelines for 
moving technology from research to product 
development. This study can form an archetype 
for the improvement of guidelines helping in the 
technology transfer that are responsive to the 
unique requirements of a given organisation. 
As a result of this study, those factors that 
affect technology transfer have been identified and 
are discussed in the order of their relative importance: 
(a) Technical Understanding3 
It is necessary that research personnel fully 
understand the main technology before passing 
it on. Though this may seem obvious, it is 
not always the case. 
It is necessary to evaluate the benefits of 
new technology in comparison to what is 
already available and to other competitive 
advancements. 
One must identify where it will fit in the product 
line and what requirements must be met to 
reach the fit. 
One possible means of manufacturing needs 
to be exhibited. 
(b) Feasibility 
A good estimate of user need is essential for 
the' success of any technology management 
and transfer venture. 
Some estimate of cost effectiveness should be 
made. 
In some cases, feasibility implies acceptability 
by the end user. This would recognise some 
kind of joint study with actual users to establish 
feasibility. 
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(c) Advanced Development Overlap 
For projects being transferred out, some overlap 
of research activities may be needed, either 
to support development or to explore advanced 
or related technologies. For systems work 
(computer software), creation of special advanced 
development effort is often the answer to problems 
of scaling-up or to answer questions of economic 
feasibility. 
(d) Growth Potential 
When projects are narrowly focused on a specific 
need and do not have paths to technical growth 
and product applicability, the technology transfer 
may suffer. This is because existing technologies 
stretch themselves add the limited advantage 
offered by the new technology may not be 
sufficient to warrant a change. 
(e) Existence of an Advocate4 
A strong proponent activity is needed to help 
overcome the hurdles during the technology 
transfer process. 
(f) Advanced Technology Activities in a Development 
Laborato~y 
In moving technology from research to 
manufacturing, the advanced technology programs 
in the development laboratories are often 
necessary. (For some research organisations, 
research and advanced development units may 
work in the same group). 
(g) External Pressures 
In some cases, parallel activity by a competitor 
may help provide the push for technology transfer; 
in others, regulatory requirements may necessitate 
adoption of new technologies, for example, 
advanced waste treatment technologies. 
(h) Joint Programmes 
It was concluded that joint programmes with 
the receiver groups are beneficial, but these 
do not ensure success. 
2.3 Technology Transfer Strategy for Large1 
Complex ProductslSystems 
A generalised technology transfer strategy 
development plan is depicted in Fig. 1 and a 
description of major activities of this plan follows. 
To understand this  approach clearly and to 
operationalise the concept, real research project 
execution and actual oreanisational e x ~ e r i e n c e s  ., 
are needed. Hypothetical examples cannot easily 
convey the organisational and individual behaviour 
context that affects technology transfer. The example 
for  successful technology transfer strategy for 
a large complex system, is the integrated guided 
missile development programme (IGMDP). The 
IGMDP was taken up for the development and 
production of five types of missiles required by 
the Indian Armed Forces, viz, Agni, Prithvi, Akash, 
Tirshul, and Nag. 
The IGMDP comprised a broad spectrum of 
activities including critical technology development, 
product development, manufacturing process 
development, identification of production agencies, 
establishment of critical production agencies, 
establishment of critical production facilities, 
technology transfer and production, etc. The 
technological goal of the programme was to ensure 
that the missiles developed are contemporary in 
performance at the time of their deployment. To 
realise this goal under the threat of technology 
obsolescence and also to realise the missiles at the 
earliest possible time, the IGMDP adopted concurrent 
development and production as the key competitive 
strategy. 
Based on a critically analysed technology scenario 
for the next two decades, new technology and 
product development efforts were launched through 
collaborative effort and consortia. A coherent 
management system was developed for coordination 
of all the efforts and to harness the best talents. 
Such efforts over a decade were found extremely 
fruitful and the first milestone was achieved by 
completing all the developmental trials, user trial 
tests, and entering into the phase or production or 
the first indigenous missile for the Indian Armed 
Forces. 
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EXISTING R&D ORGANISATION 
I 
7 SELECT SUCCESSFLIL AND I I 1. DEVELOP A SETOF 2 RELATE ACTIVITIES TO UNSUCCESSFULTECH ACTIVITIES THAT FOSTER STAGES OFTECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROJECTS TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER I4 
4. DEVELOP A LlST OF 
ACTIVITIES THAT MIGHT 
EACH PROJECT CRITERIA FOR EACH POSITIVELY AFFECTTHE 
TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION CRITERIA 
5. MAKE A LlST OF H 6. DEVELOP SUGGESTIONS IMPEDIMENTS TO FOR OVERCOMING THESE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IMPEDIMENTS 
9. REFINE ITEMS 1 THRU 6 
BASED UPON CASE STUDY 




10. PREP4RE A DOCUMENT 
THAT PROVIDES GENERAL 
GUIDELINES FOR 
I ORGANIZATION-SPECIFIC I 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER I STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT I 
Figure 1. Technology transfer strategy development plan 
3. TECHNOLOGY & DEVELOPMENT Facilities or technoware includes all physical entities 
Technology and warfare are closely related. necessary for transformation such as equipment, 
On one hand, the industrialised nations have used machinery, plants, andfactories. Abilitiesorhumanware 
technology for maintaining their lead in the developed includes creativity, skills, perseverance, and ingenuity. 
world, developing countries mostly depend upon Facts or inforware includes specifications, designs, 
imported technologies for their growth. The threat theories, and observations. Framework for orgaware 
to real life exerts a strong push on the higher-level includes systematisation, networks, management, 
technology for military hardware. Thus, the and marketing. Out ofthesebasic elements, humanware 
development of new and advanced level of technology is the ultimate source of technolonv, while inforware 
-- -. 
becomes a continuous process for military weapon is designed to evolve as a new type of capital- 
systems development and acquisition. Ultimately, knowledge. 
it is the technology that becomes the force-multiplier, 
But technology cannot remain any more a black Technology cannot be created or transformed 
box. without proper technology climate. Such a climate 
cannot be restricted to only a research and development 
Technology is a combination of four basic organisation; but should envelope the entire matrix, 
components5-8-facilities, abilities, facts, and frameworks. including the industry and the users. 
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4. MANAGEMENT OF MAJOR WEAPON which demands both, an understanding of that 
SYSTEMS process and the implementation of basic engineering 
Cardinal Newman quoted that, "Nothing would 
be done at all if a man waited until he could do 
it so well, no one could find fault with it". Much 
of the rapid progress made by the early developers 
of radar in Britain during the second world war 
can be attributed to Sir Robert Watsoin-Watt's 
doctrine of using the third best-the best being 
unattainable and the second best unavailable, until 
too late. Fortunately for him and for the Royal 
Air Force and Britain, his programme review groups 
- - 
disciplines and their control mechanisms. Transition 
from full-scale development into production places 
particular demands on engineering design, test 
and manufacturing, in both application and timing, 
and emphasises assurance of design stability and 
certification of the manufacturing process. The 
problems with the acquisition process are not 
administrative, but instead technical and techno- 
political. The technical process focuses on three 
critical activities-design, test, and production. 
did not have access to today's procedures and 
techniques for ensuring optimal solutions to each 5. OVERVIEW OF TRANSITION PROCESS 
problem. 
The challenge of programme management9 is 
to find the practical middle ground between producing 
underdeveloped systems and extended development 
and testing to the nIh degree of a few high-cost 
systems that never reached rate production. The 
key guidelines to be followed are: 
Select an acquisition strategy and risk management 
plan in context with the unique aspects of the 
programme. 
Avoid planning a development-to-production 
gap into the program. 
Enter full-scale development only with a solid 
technology base and a management commitment 
Transition from development-to-production is 
not an event with a readily identifiable starting 
point in the acquisition process. The transition 
process incorporates many activities. It is a continuum 
of interrelated and interdependent activities. Military 
acquisition has time and again extended the product 
development efforts well into the production phase. 
As a consequence, numerous product changes are 
introduced, planning essential for manufacturing 
is delayed, and the burden on manufacturing to 
make up time for engineering delays is a monumental 
task for what could otherwise be a successful acquisition 
programme. Fast tracking is a high-risk venture. 
The transition process is very broad and it is impacted 
by activities that are not done in the early design 
and testing. 
for timely support and continuity of effort, Planning for production and manufacturing provided that the need still exists and satisfactory engineering, following the design process5, is a 
progress is maintained. major transition process risk. Documented early 
Plan for transition-to-production, starting at 
programme initiation. 
Management of a major weapon system, from 
development through production, requires effective 
administration and coordination of many activities. 
At the production phase, large financial commitments 
are made based on the detailed planning of previous 
. . 
phases. The transition is a highly visible, highly 
reactive time which lays emphasis on preparation 
for production and change management. A programme 
manager7 should recognise the fundamental principle 
that systems acquisition is an industrial process 
producibility, engineering and planning integrated 
with advanced development, offers benefits of increased 
end-item compatibility with the process and procedures 
necessary to produce the item, and reduces the 
number of changes in the product configuration 
introduced on the factory floor. Acquisition costs 
and schedule delays could be reduced when the 
programme is s t ~ c t u r e d  to accommodate the transition 
to production. 
Documented early planning focusing on the 
specifics of the manufacturing practices and processes 
required to build the end-item should be initiated 
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while the design is fluid, and completed before the 
start of rate production. A manufacturing plan should 
be a comprehensive document, to provide guidelines 
for action, to identify and give visibility of high- 
risk factors, and then provide direction by which 
the risk can be minimised. The essential elements 
of a manufacturing plan, which will significantly 
reduce the risk of transitioning a programme from 
development to production are: 
Master delivery schedule which identifies by 
each major sub-assembly, the time spans, need 
dates, and the person responsible. 
Hard tooling requirements to meet increased 
production rates as the programme progresses. 
Special tools 
Special test ehuipment 
Assembly flow charts 
Receiving inspection requirements and yield 
thresholds 
Production yield thresholds 
Productibility Studies. 
6. EMERGING PARADIGMS IN 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN 
STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES 
For client nations in the developing world, 
more transfer of technology to assemblellicence 
manufacture componentslsubsystems of major systems, 
is no longer acceptable. Access to reallO,l' technology 
is being insisted upon, as exemplified by the insistence 
of United Arab Emirates (UAE) on access to source 
codes of the advance capability F-16 D Block 60 
fighter aircraft's advanced avionics/electronic warfare 
suites, the development of which was being funded 
by UAE as part of its order worth US$ 7 billion 
plus for the supply of 80 fighter aircraft. UAE's 
demand for the access to sensitive source codes- 
an unprecedented demand by a tiny, third world 
(but oil-rich) country, is now threatening to scuttle 
the whole contract, since US DoD is unlikely to 
permit such access. This episode is a good example 
of the kind of hard bargaining and political-cum- 
technological issues involved in transfer of technology 
in strategic systems. 
In addition to access to sensitive technologies, 
client nations insist on extensive technological offsets 
of varying degrees, in terms of contract value and 
also technological content. In one notorious, extreme 
example of offsets being used to win contracts, 
Boeing offered offsets worth 140 per cent of the 
value of contract, when it offered its E-3 Sentry12 
airborne warning and control system (AWACS), in 
a contract worth US $1 billion, to UK's Royal Air 
Force, ie, Boeing agreed to buy-back goodslservices 
worth US $ 1.4 billion from UK, for obtaining a 
contract worth U S  $ 1 billion! However, in most 
recent contracts, offsets range from 30-50 per cent, 
with the seller obliged to transfer and set up a 
whole range of manufacturing/service operations 
in the client nation. The most recent example of 
the kind of technology offsets being offered can 
be seen in Australia's Wedgetail airborne early 
warning and control aircraft (AEW&C) system program, 
valued at US $ 824 million. All the three bidders 
for this contract, ie, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, 
and Boeing, are offering to set up centres of excellence 
in Australia to support the system, manufacture 
substantial portion of the system through Australian 
contractors, and generate additional revenues for 
Australian companies in future by re-export to other 
clients. Similar campaign is being waged for UK's 
requirement for airborne stand-off radar (ASTOR) 
p r ~ g r a m m e l ~ - ~ ~  valued at US $ 1.2 billion. In this 
programme, too, the three bidders-Northrop Grumman, 
Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon (all American) offered 
extensive offsets to UK companies as partners and 
the prospects for re-exports to other clients for 
similar systems. To sum up, in an intensively competitive 
field, the sellers have to offer extensive carrots- 
technological offsets in the form of partnerships 
to the client countries and also a share in future 
sales of such systems to other countries. The days 
of simple barter deals, involving, say, crude oil for 
combat aircraft or ships or tanks, are essentially 
over. However, this particular scenario may not 
apply to a group of third-world nations, who are 
not in the most-favoured nation status with the 
developed countries-eg India. 
Where the seller agrees to substantial offsets, 
it still does not automatically mean that the client 
country has full control over the technology transferred. 
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For instance, US DoDl Dept ofCommerce, exercise 
strict control over all the technologies of US origin 
soldltransferred to third-world nabions and at any 
point of time, can veto re-export of systems 
incorporating US technologies. A case in point is 
the Swedish JAS-39 Gripen fighter, which has extensive 
systems and technologies of US origin, including 
the engine. For export of the JAS-39 Gripen fighter 
to South Africa, Sweden had enormous trouble to 
obtain the necessary re-export licence clearnces 
from the various US Govt agencies. The obvious 
implication is that even if some technology is 
transferred, it does not automatically bestow ownership 
to the client companylnation. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Transfer of technopogy will continue to he used 
as a powerful tool of global geopolitical power 
projection by the developed countries as an extension 
of their foreign policies, either through overt or 
covert measures. In exercising control over transfer 
of technology in sensitivelstrategic industries and 
technologies, the developed countries will continue 
to act in concert, through such measures like Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), European 
Union Dual-use Regulation 1994, US Dept of 
Commerce Munitions List, etc. 
For nations like India, there is no option but 
to invest in the indigenous R&D and S&T base in 
sensitivelstrategic industries. 
The technology transfers involve mostly transfer 
of know-how, not know-why. In many high-tech, 
complex technologies like main battle tanks, fighter 
aircraft, submarines, etc, nations which were recipients 
of transfer of technology, did notlcould not transit 
themselves into fully ca~able   lavers in these fields 
. . . . 
on their own, inspite of decades of licence production 
of such systems, eg, India (Hindustan Aeronautics 
Limited), which licence produced western combat 
aircraft like Foland Gnat, Sepecat Jaguar, Alloutte 
helicopters, and Soviet fighters like MiG 21M and 
MiG 27M, for over 20 years yet is finding the 
development of light combat aircraft (LCA) and 
ALH an uphill task. Even where only modernisationl 
upgradation of MiG 21M aircraft for the Indian 
Air Force was involved, the order for 125 kits, 
each valued at US $3 million plus, went to the 
MiG-MAP0 Bureau, Russia, with Hindustan 
Aeronautics Limited performing only the assembly 
of the kits in India: this, after manufacturing the 
MiG 21M in India for almost 20 years. In fact, 
Swedenl6." for its JAS-39 Gripen fighter has to 
rely on American technology partners in the 
development and production of its F-2 fighter, which 
is essentially an F-16D derivative, with more than 
50 per cent US technology input: however, despite 
more than 15 year development cycle, the F-2 fighter 
aircraft is arguably the costliest fighter is its class 
at a unit price of US $80 million plus, with only 
marginal improvements iir performance over the 
latest F-16D Block 60 advanced capability model, 
being developed for UAE by Lockheed Martin, 
which costs approx. US $60 million. If an industrial 
superpower like Japan with its vast high-tech industry 
and R&D base, who has vast experience in transfer 
of technology, that too after licence production of 
F-15 fighter, which is even more powerful than 
F-16, is so disappointing, that difficulties experienced 
by India can be imagined. 
Economics of scale and complexities is 
technologies, especially in major weapon systems, 
would increasingly render the concepts of self 
sufficiency and even self reliance, impossible ideals 
to achieve, even by the developed countries. In 
the 21" Century, with the exception of the US and 
possibly, Russia, probably no nation would venture 
to undertake development of major weapon systems 
on its own: even Americans are actively soliciting 
international partners in its Joint Strike Fighter 
(JSF) programme, which would arguably be the 
largest Combat Aircraft program in the world, for 
the next 40 years, with over US $50 Billion in 
sales projected. 
Judicious transfer of technology/technology master 
plans at national level, balancing resources versus 
national security interests, are the only answers to 
the challenges of the emerging new technological 
imperialism. One has to augment the indigenous 
S&T/R&D base, with trustworthy international alliances 
and partnerships in critical technology areas. 
Experience in transfer of technology with those 
of Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), 
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Dept of Atomic Energy (DAE), Council for Scientific 
and Industrial Research (CSIR) and Defence Research 
and Development Organisation (DRDO) must be 
pooled into a knowledge bank to derive the benefits 
of synergy of the programs of these organisations. 
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